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NOTES
YOU CAN’T HAVE YOUR VOTE AND DILUTE IT TOO:
CLOSING THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT LOOPHOLE IN
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine sitting down with a blank page, extensive instructions on
what to draw, and thousands of potential ways to draw the picture.
You are told that there is no objectively correct way to draw the picture, but there could very well be an incorrect way. Nonetheless, you
receive countless and conflicting versions of the correct way to
approach this task. More importantly, if you draw incorrectly, your
decision could detrimentally impact tens of thousands of lives. You
have fewer than 100 days to complete the job.1 This is the process of
legislative redistricting.
Every ten years, the United States becomes a canvas. At the turn
of each decade, legislators and commissions gather in various forms
to redraw the legislative districts in America.2 This is an arduous
and daunting task that has significant ramifications. The factors
that these line-drawers3 must, should, and do consider are numerous.4 At the start, a handful of “traditional redistricting principles”
inform the drawing of lines.5 These principles include compactness,
contiguity, preserving communities of interest, and adhering to existing political boundaries.6 Simply adhering to the traditional
factors can create significant challenges. And the challenges do not
stop at basic policy choices; they extend deep into the legal realm.

1. For a complete breakdown of states and their redistricting timelines, see State
Redistricting Guidelines, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Mar. 29, 2021), https://www.
ncsl.org/research/redistricting/state-redistricting-deadlines637224581.aspx [https://perma.cc/
CNM2-8L7X].
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; 2 U.S.C. § 2a.
3. Because each jurisdiction varies as to whether the legislature, a citizen commission,
or some combination thereof draws legislative districts, this Note uses the term “line-drawers”
as a catch-all term to describe those tasked with creating legislative districts.
4. See Frederick McBride & Meredith Bell-Platts, Extreme Makeover: Racial Consideration and the Voting Rights Act in the Politics of Redistricting, 1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 327,
349-56 (2005) (explaining that such factors may include compactness, contiguity, respect for
county and municipal lines, protecting communities of interest, protecting incumbents, and
creating competitive districts).
5. Id. at 349.
6. Id. See generally Katharine Inglis Butler, Redistricting in a Post-Shaw Era: A Small
Treatise Accompanied by Districting Guidelines for Legislators, Litigants, and Courts, 36 U.
RICH. L. REV. 137 (2002).
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In drawing legislative lines, significant legal obligations bind linedrawers, and line-drawers can suffer repercussions for drawing
districts improperly.7 As a baseline consideration, each district must
have substantially the same number of voters.8 Additionally, although redistricting is a delicate and demanding task, line-drawers
must conform district lines to equal protection standards.9 In 1965,
Congress added yet another layer to these legal obligations by
passing the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA).10 The Act aimed to
provide specific protections to voters so that they would not be
discriminated against in the voting process “on account of race or
color.”11 Should the line-drawers fall short of upholding these
obligations, courts can find the bounds unconstitutional, sometimes
forcing the line-drawers to begin the process all over again.12
The task of balancing competing interests—including policy goals,
traditional considerations, and legal obligations—places linedrawers in tricky situations. If the line-drawers strike an imbalance, litigation often follows.13 And although courts had long
hesitated to wander into the “political thicket,” they are now deeply
entrenched in adjudicating redistricting controversies.14 As courts
aim to interpret and enforce the legal obligations inherent in redistricting, they begin to encounter a particularly thorny thicket. In
7. See generally Butler, supra note 6 (providing an overview of the case law and statutes
that impose districting obligations on legislators and providing guidelines for how to meet
objectives and abide by those obligations).
8. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 207-08 (1962) (establishing the “one person, one vote”
standard in order to avoid vote dilution and disproportionate representation).
9. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 641-42, 649 (1993).
10. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 52
U.S.C. §§ 10101, 10301-10314, 10501-10508, 10701-10702).
11. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a).
12. See Butler, supra note 6, at 161, 226.
13. See id. at 195-214 (providing an extensive overview of redistricting cases that
improperly considered racial criteria). Not all scholars believe that the challenge of redistricting with one eye on the VRA and one eye on the Constitution is all that much of a
challenge. See Justin Levitt, Race, Redistricting, and the Manufactured Conundrum, 50 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 555, 603-04 (2017) (“The ostensible angst about the difficulty of complying with
both the Voting Rights Act and the Constitution is a manufactured conundrum.”).
14. Compare Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (cautioning courts against
entering the “political thicket” and emphasizing that the remedy for improper redistricting
is to elect legislatures that will redistrict appropriately), with Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd.
of Elections (Bethune-Hill I), 141 F. Supp. 3d 505, 552-71 (E.D. Va. 2015) (conducting an indepth, district-by-district analysis of the boundaries of each district in question), aff’d in part,
vacated in part, 137 S. Ct. 788 (2017).
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racial gerrymandering cases that involve compliance with VRA
section 2, many of these thorns are the Supreme Court’s and Congress’s own making.15
The problem with creating and enforcing redistricting standards
arises poignantly in racial gerrymandering cases that involve VRA
section 2 compliance. In many ways, the rights that the Equal Protection Clause seeks to protect are at odds with the rights that
section 2 seeks to protect. On the one hand, equal protection asserts
a certain color-blindness, an interest in minimizing the focus on race
and, in doing so, maximizing equality for all.16 On the other hand,
the VRA suggests, and in fact requires, line-drawers keep at least
one eye on race when drawing lines.17
These opposing rights create a tension, which is enhanced by the
tests and standards that courts have implemented to enforce both
rights.18 Consistent with the color-blind aims of equal protection, in
gerrymandering claims, a court’s first inquiry is into race predominance—the extent to which it appears that line-drawers primarily
considered race in their drawing of the lines.19 In addressing section
2 claims, on the other hand, a court’s primary inquiry is into the
outcomes and effects of the district on racial minorities.20 Put
simply, equal protection demands that line-drawers do not pay attention to race; the VRA demands that they do. This tension creates
a potential loophole—a situation in which line-drawers can assert
compliance with section 2, but in fact dilute the minority vote by
15. See Jeffrey G. Hamilton, Deeper into the Political Thicket: Racial and Political
Gerrymandering and the Supreme Court, 43 EMORY L.J. 1519, 1525-27 (1994).
16. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 641-42 (1993) (finding that white plaintiffs likely
stated a claim when asserting the right to a “color-blind” vote). For insight as to how the
notion of “color-blindness” in general can constitute a harmful assimilationist theory in the
antiracism context, see IBRAM X. KENDI, HOW TO BE AN ANTIRACIST 31-32, 201-02 (2019).
17. See 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b). For insight as to how the idea of race-consciousness in
general can constitute a harmful segregationist theory in the antiracism context, see KENDI,
supra note 16, at 31-32.
18. Compare Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47, 50-51, 55-56, 58 (1986) (requiring
overt racial considerations, such as a minority racial group’s political cohesion and the
majority racial group’s ability to vote as a bloc), with Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904
(1995) (emphasizing that race neutrality is the “central mandate” of the Equal Protection
Clause).
19. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 909-10.
20. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47 (“The essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral law
... interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities
enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives.”).
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drawing a racial gerrymander.21 In practice, this looks like linedrawers creating a district in which there are “too many” voters of
color.22 In creating the district, the line-drawers may assert that
they were forced to draw the lines as they did to comply with the
VRA’s requirements. In reality, they may have intentionally or inadvertently “diluted” minority voting strength by “packing” voters
of color in one district (thereby robbing the voters of the opportunity
to make their voices heard across the state).23
This Note analyzes the loophole as a consequence of courts
enforcing the “competing” rights that the Equal Protection Clause
and the VRA protect. It contemplates the problems that these
consequences pose and proposes a new framework for courts to use
when they approach these cases. Part I provides a background as to
how the Supreme Court arrived at each of the relevant standards:
the race predominance test for racial gerrymandering cases and the
“effects test” for VRA cases. Next, Part II discusses the problems
that these tests create when they interact, specifically how the tests
can create an avenue for line-drawers to discriminate based on race
or dilute minority votes, whether intentionally or inadvertently.
Part III proposes a framework to address these concerns that
considers the broader realities and impacts of the two tests. That
Part argues that courts should establish a presumption of race predominance for racial gerrymandering cases in which section 2
compliance serves as the government’s compelling interest. Further,
when evaluating narrow tailoring, courts should analyze whether
the district, as drawn, has in fact diluted minority votes by asking
whether the line-drawers included more voters of color in the
21. See, e.g., Scott Reed, Commentary, Drawing Lines: Racial Gerrymandering in
Bethune-Hill v. Virginia Board of Elections, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 177,
187 (2017); Michael Kent Curtis, Using the Voting Rights Act to Discriminate: North Carolina’s Use of Racial Gerrymanders, Two Racial Quotas, Safe Harbors, Shields, and
Inoculations to Undermine Multiracial Coalitions and Black Political Power, 51 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 421, 424 (2016).
22. See, e.g., Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections (Bethune-Hill II), 326 F. Supp. 3d
128, 138 (E.D. Va. 2018). Note that the concept of “too many” or “too few” voters of color in a
district is itself debatable. This Note does not purport to determine the proper balance, but
rather asserts that under the existing frameworks, at some point line-drawers do cross a
boundary from permissible race-conscious line drawing for VRA purposes to impermissible,
racially driven gerrymandering.
23. See, e.g., id. The Bethune-Hill II case is a particularly clear example of this
phenomenon because the Virginia legislature was transparent about its motives. See id.
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district than reasonably necessary to comply with the VRA. If so,
courts should find that the district is not narrowly tailored to the
state’s interest in complying with the VRA. Lastly, Part IV addresses potential critiques of this framework, including the Court’s
over-involvement in the “political thicket,” concerns that this Note’s
proposal could work against the interests of the VRA, and questions
as to the usefulness of this framework, especially if the Supreme
Court were to strike down section 2 in the coming years.24
I. INTO AND AROUND THE THICKET: HOW GERRYMANDERING AND
VOTING RIGHTS ACT STANDARDS EMERGED
Although line-drawers have been drawing legislative districts in
the United States for centuries, racial gerrymandering claims did
not emerge until the late 1950s, and VRA claims emerged over a
decade later.25 There are obvious reasons for this emergence—
namely, the abolition of slavery, the passage of the Fifteenth
Amendment, and the continued increase in Black civic participation
from the late nineteenth century into the early twentieth century.26
This Part outlines the emergence of both racial gerrymandering
and section 2 claims by describing the fundamental statutes and
cases that formed today’s standards. Section A reviews the historical
and social conditions that led to the quintessential gerrymandering
case, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, and how that case established the initial racial gerrymandering principles.27 Next, Section B outlines the
events leading to the passage of the VRA and the back-and-forth
creation of standards between the Supreme Court and Congress in
24. Although the Court has not overtly expressed an intent to overturn section 2, it has
slowly chipped away at various provisions of the VRA over the past decade. See, e.g., Shelby
County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (holding section 4(b) of the VRA, which established the
formula for determining which jurisdictions needed federal “preclearance” prior to enacting
changes to election laws, unconstitutional); Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct.
2321 (2021) (holding that Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy and prohibition on third-party ballot
collection did not violate section 2, despite the policies’ disparate impacts on minority voters);
see also Michael Li & Yurij Rudensky, Rethinking the Redistricting Toolbox, 62 HOW. L.J. 713,
720 (2019).
25. See e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340-41 (1960); Gingles, 478 U.S. at 34.
26. See Jonathan L. Entin, Of Squares and Uncouth Twenty-Eight-Sided Figures: Reflections on Gomillion v. Lightfoot After Half a Century, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 133, 133-35 (2010).
27. See 364 U.S. at 347-48.
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their aftermath. Finally, Section C addresses the current standards
that have been refined by decades of case law and the loophole that
those standards have created.
A. The Emergence of Racial Gerrymandering Claims
Although the term “gerrymandering” was recognized in the United States as early as 1812,28 the racial gerrymander did not make
its way into the courts until 1960 in Gomillion.29 In the aftermath
of World War II and the Civil Rights Act of 1957, activists were
registering a significant number of Black voters in Tuskegee,
Alabama.30 The increase in Black voter registration began to
drastically change the makeup of the predominantly white electorate.31 In light of these social movements toward equality, a state
senator introduced legislation to redraw the boundaries of the
county more favorably for white voters.32 The Act created an “uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure” that removed over 400 Black voters
from the district, leaving merely four or five Black voters inside the
district.33 The Supreme Court struck down the map as a racial
gerrymander.34 Finding that the State asserted no compelling
interest to combat the allegations of race discrimination, but instead
asserted unbridled power in political decision-making, the Court
held that the State’s actions amounted to a violation of equal protection.35 Thus, it became clear that states could violate an individual’s equal protection rights by drawing legislative districts in an
overtly discriminatory manner.36 And so the racial gerrymander was
born.

28. Erick Trickey, Where Did the Term “Gerrymander” Come from?, SMITHSONIAN MAG.
(July 20, 2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/where-did-term-gerrymander-come180964118/ [https://perma.cc/J24U-ZQC9].
29. See 364 U.S. at 341.
30. Entin, supra note 26, at 135-38 (providing an in-depth overview of the context in which
Gomillion took place).
31. See id.
32. See id. at 137-38.
33. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 340-41.
34. Id. at 347-48.
35. Id. at 342.
36. See id. at 347-48.

1022

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:1015

B. The Emergence of the Voting Rights Act
Shortly after Gomillion, in 1965, Congress passed the historic
VRA, aimed at strengthening protections for minority voters.37 In
section 2 of the Act, Congress enacted the broad provision that “[n]o
voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice,
or procedure shall be imposed ... to deny or abridge the right of any
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.”38
This provision was quite unique and would ultimately come to cast
a much wider net than the Gomillion Court intended the Equal
Protection Clause to cover in this context.39 Section 2 would not only
be used to invalidate practices that overtly denied minority voters
the right to vote, but it would also be used to invalidate practices
that denied minority voters the effectiveness of their votes.40 This
expanded right would ultimately open the door to litigation in cases
of minority vote dilution and minority vote denial.41
At first, however, section 2 was a nearly dormant provision that
did little more than echo the sentiment of the Fifteenth Amendment.42 The Supreme Court emphasized this point in City of Mobile

37. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 52
U.S.C. §§ 10101, 10301-10314, 10501-10508, 10701-10702); see also Terrye Conroy, The Voting
Rights Act of 1965: A Selected Annotated Bibliography, 98 LAW LIBR. J. 663, 663 (2006) (“The
Voting Rights Act of 1965 is widely considered one of the most important and successful civil
rights laws ever enacted.” (footnote omitted)). Of the extraordinary nature of the VRA, some
members of the Supreme Court have recently said: “The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is an
extraordinary law. Rarely has a statute required so much sacrifice to ensure its passage.
Never has a statute done more to advance the Nation’s highest ideals. And few laws are more
vital in the current moment.” Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2351
(2021) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
38. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a).
39. See Daniel McCool, Meaningful Votes, in THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT: CONTRASTING PERSPECTIVES ON THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 3, 5 (Daniel McCool ed., 2012).
40. Mary J. Kosterlitz, Note, Thornburg v. Gingles: The Supreme Court’s New Test for
Analyzing Minority Vote Dilution, 36 CATH. UNIV. L. REV. 531, 531 (1987).
41. Vote dilution represents the idea that the voting strength of minority voters can be
“diluted” by strategic or discriminatory line-drawing that amplifies the voices of white voters.
See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35, 38 (1986). Vote denial represents the idea that
certain practices, such as voter ID laws, may operate to deny minority voters the opportunity
to exercise the right to vote. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181,
187 (2008).
42. Li & Rudensky, supra note 24, at 720-21.
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v. Bolden.43 In that case, the city of Mobile, Alabama, held at-large
elections, meaning that multiple representatives were elected from
a large district (as opposed to one representative per smaller, more
divided district).44 The at-large districting scheme meant that even
though there were areas that had high Black voter populations,
there was no district drawn to represent and protect the value of
their votes.45 This type of election stunted the ability of Black voters
to influence the outcome because they composed only a minority of
the population within the at-large district.46 Because there was only
a singular, at-large voting district, the majority white population
could continue to elect its legislators of choice, pulling support from
the entire state.47 In spite of the obvious discriminatory effect of this
scheme, the Supreme Court held that a demonstration of discriminatory intent was necessary to make a claim under section 2.48 A
showing of disparate effects was not enough.49 The Court was
unwilling to strike down the legislative map absent some showing
of invidious purpose or intent, emphasizing that section 2’s protections did not differ from or expand the protections inherent in the
Fifteenth Amendment.50
In essence, the Supreme Court was attempting to create a VRA
standard that perfectly mirrored the equal protection standard.51
This, however, was not what Congress had in mind. Shortly after
Bolden, and following vigorous debate, Congress spoke loudly and
clearly over the Court, amending section 2 to provide for a purely
results-based test.52 The amendment meant that a discriminatory
43. 446 U.S. 55, 61 (1980) (holding that section 2 “was intended to have an effect no
different from that of the Fifteenth Amendment itself”).
44. Id. at 58.
45. Comment, At-Large Electoral Schemes and Vote Dilution: City of Mobile v. Bolden, 94
HARV. L. REV. 138, 139 n.10 (1980).
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 67-68.
49. Id.
50. See id. at 61 (emphasizing that section 2 did not add anything to the plaintiffs’
Fifteenth Amendment claim).
51. Compare id. at 63-66 (analyzing appellees’ claim under section 2), with id. at 66
(analyzing appellees’ claim under the Equal Protection Clause).
52. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134
(codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b)) (including new language providing that an
analysis of vote dilution or denial shall be “based on the totality of circumstances”
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purpose, or lack thereof, would not be a prerequisite for, nor dispositive of, a VRA claim.53 In order to quell the opposition, Congress
also included a provision to clarify that the new effects standard did
not mandate proportional representation.54 This put a swift end to
the Supreme Court’s attempt at mirroring the equal protection
standards and section 2 standards.55 The amendment, however, also
began the ongoing saga of untangling the application of two
somewhat opposing standards—the discriminatory purpose test for
equal protection and the discriminatory results test for the VRA.56
Just four years after Congress enacted the 1982 amendments, the
Supreme Court addressed how to interpret Congress’s results test.
In Thornburg v. Gingles, newly bound by Congress’s results test, the
Court struck down five North Carolina legislative districts because
they were not drawn in such a way as to enable Black voters to elect
their candidates of choice.57 The Court in Gingles established that,
as a threshold matter, courts should look for three specific factors
in determining whether the line-drawers should draw a majorityminority district.58 Known as the “Gingles preconditions,” these
factors include: (1) that the minority group is sufficiently large and
compact, (2) that the minority voters are politically cohesive, and
(3) that the majority consistently votes as a bloc and defeats the
minority’s candidate of choice.59 After these conditions are met,
courts will evaluate if the minority voters were meaningfully
demonstrating that “members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to
... elect representatives of their choice”).
53. See id.
54. See id. (providing that the new provisions did not establish any right to proportional
representation for members of a suspect class). The fear that the statute could be construed
to require proportional representation was a significant concern of its opponents. See Thomas
M. Boyd & Stephen J. Markman, The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A
Legislative History, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1390-92 (1983).
55. See McBride & Bell-Platts, supra note 4, at 337-38.
56. See id. at 341, 344-45.
57. 478 U.S. 30, 34, 79-80 (1986).
58. Id. at 48-51. Majority-minority districts are those in which racial minorities compose
the majority of voters in a district. While these districts certainly help communities of color
elect their candidate of choice (provided the Gingles preconditions are met), it is worth noting
that there are arguments for the proposition that majority-minority districts can hurt the
interests of minority voters by creating less statewide accountability to minority voters. See
L. Marvin Overby & Kenneth M. Cosgrove, Unintended Consequences? Racial Redistricting
and the Representation of Minority Interests, 58 J. POL. 540, 540-41 (1996).
59. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48-51.

2022]

CLOSING THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT LOOPHOLE

1025

prevented from electing their candidates of choice under the totality
of the circumstances.60 To do this, courts must consider a variety of
flexible factors, known as the “Senate Factors,” such as history of
discriminatory voting practices, extent of racially polarized voting,
use of enhancing practices, and success of minority candidates.61
The Court’s decision in Gingles was unanimous, but for varying
reasons.62 Nonetheless, the result indicated that plaintiffs may, in
fact, bring a claim under section 2 if these threshold conditions are
met and the totality of the circumstances points to minority vote
dilution, regardless of the intent or purpose of the line-drawers who
created the conditions.63
C. Interactions Between the Voting Rights Act and Equal
Protection Clause
These developments were largely considered victories for minority
voters because the intent test established in Bolden was too demanding and too limited to provide meaningful relief for voter
suppression.64 If the purpose of the VRA was to protect the right of
minority voters to elect the candidates of their choice, requiring a
“smoking gun” or definitive proof as to a line-drawer’s “‘sole’ or
‘dominant’ motivation” made it nearly impossible to realize that
purpose.65

60. Id. at 46.
61. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206-07.
Congress included the Senate Factors in its report accompanying the 1982 VRA amendments
“to guide courts in assessing liability under the new standard.” Dale E. Ho, Voting Rights
Litigation After Shelby County: Mechanics and Standards in Section 2 Vote Denial Claims,
17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 675, 689 (2014).
62. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 34, 82-84, 106. In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor was
particularly concerned by her interpretation that the Court’s holding required that states
grant minority voters the “maximum feasible ... voting strength.” Id. at 89 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring). She surmised that this meant the Court was, in essence, requiring “proportional
representation.” Id. at 91.
63. See id. at 80 (majority opinion).
64. See Frank R. Parker, The “Results” Test of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act:
Abandoning the Intent Standard, 69 VA. L. REV. 715, 734-40 (1983) (highlighting the “storm
of criticism” that followed the Bolden decision and the difficulties that the intent standard
created).
65. Id. at 740-41 (quoting Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971)).
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But the right to select the candidate of a minority community’s
choice was not the only right that the Court sought to protect.
Shortly after Bolden, the 1982 VRA amendments, and the Court’s
clarification of those amendments in Gingles, the Supreme Court
heard a gerrymandering case in which these developments came
face-to-face with the Equal Protection Clause.66 In Shaw v. Reno, a
group of white plaintiffs sued North Carolina for racial gerrymandering in two U.S. congressional districts.67 The white plaintiffs
alleged that the districts were drawn irregularly in order to intentionally concentrate Black voters together in the two legislative
districts.68 In evaluating what it considered some of “the most
complex and sensitive issues [the] Court ha[d] faced,” the majority
concluded that the plaintiffs, at a minimum, stated a claim as to the
constitutionality of the districts under the Equal Protection
Clause.69 In order to come to this decision, the Court had to grapple
with precisely what right it was trying to protect, demonstrating an
inherent—and perhaps, unexpected—tension between the VRA and
the Equal Protection Clause.
The plaintiffs alleged that the districting process had infringed on
their right to a “‘color-blind’ electoral process.”70 Although the Court
did not expressly adopt the plaintiffs’ language with regard to a
right to color-blindness, it implicitly affirmed that the right existed.71 The Court acknowledged that the right may not exist
absolutely—that is, race-consciousness in line drawing is not inherently unconstitutional.72 However, when the districts appear so
irregular on their face that they can only be perceived as an effort
to segregate based on race, line-drawers may violate an equal
66. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 633-34, 642 (1993).
67. Id. at 633-34, 638.
68. Id. at 637.
69. Id. at 633. Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, emphasized that these “complex
and sensitive issues” were “the meaning of the constitutional ‘right’ to vote, and the propriety
of race-based state legislation designed to benefit members of historically disadvantaged racial minority groups.” Id.
70. Id. at 641-42. It is important to note that the plaintiffs in Shaw were all white
plaintiffs who did not live in the gerrymandered district. Id. at 638. Instead, they asserted
that the statewide scheme violated their equal protection rights. Id. at 642. Interestingly, the
Court did not consider standing.
71. See id.
72. See id.
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protection right.73 As a result, if race is the predominant consideration in the creation of a district, courts must subject the district to
strict scrutiny.74
Two years later, the Court clarified how to determine whether
race was the predominant consideration. In a Georgia gerrymandering case, Miller v. Johnson, the Court articulated that race predominates when a plaintiff proves “that the legislature subordinated
traditional race-neutral districting principles ... to racial considerations.”75 The thrust of this race-predominance test is somewhat
unclear; the Court did not clarify whether this inquiry relied on
purely evidentiary results or on the subjective intent of the linedrawers.76 Developments in later cases indicate, however, that intent is a critical factor in determining race predominance.77
Both Shaw and Miller highlight the complex clash that had
emerged between equal protection analysis and the VRA analysis by
the 1990s: color-blindness measured by purpose versus race-consciousness measured by effects.78
II. A FLOOR WITH NO CEILING: EXPLORING THE PROBLEM
The tension between these rights and obligations persists today
in a confusing contradiction at times. And as long as this tension
remains, it leaves the door open for mistakes, discrimination, or
abuse on the part of the line-drawers. In essence, line-drawers can
use the VRA as a means to discriminate.79 This happens when linedrawers are required to (or believe they are required to) comply with
section 2 in their creation of a majority-minority district, but in creating the district, they over-inflate the number of minority voters
73. See id.
74. See, e.g., Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 231 F. Supp. 3d 1026, 1033 (M.D. Ala.
2017).
75. 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995).
76. See id.; Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Challenges to Racial Redistricting in the New Millennium: Hunt v. Cromartie as a Case Study, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
227, 246-49 (2001).
77. See Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 76, at 247.
78. See Sue T. Kilgore, Comment, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Courts,
Legislatures, and Majority-Minority Districts, 46 CATH. UNIV. L. REV. 1299, 1304-05 (1997)
(asking the question that these standards raise: “What is a legislature to do?”).
79. See Curtis, supra note 21, at 478-79.
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needed to comply with the VRA.80 This becomes a form of “packing”—placing an unnecessarily large group of minority voters in a
particular district, which ultimately dilutes the group’s voting power
throughout the rest of the state.81
If the Supreme Court finds that race predominated in the creation
of a district, it evaluates the lines under the strict scrutiny standard.82 First, the Court assesses whether there was a sufficient
compelling interest for drawing the lines as they were drawn.83
Although the Court has not expressly ruled on the matter, it often
assumes without deciding that compliance with section 2 is, in fact,
a compelling interest.84 However, this is not the end of the inquiry.
In order to assume that section 2 compliance was necessary, the
line-drawers must demonstrate that they believed themselves to be
at risk of violating section 2 if they did not create the majorityminority district in conformity with the statute.85 This showing
essentially shifts the responsibility onto the line-drawers to demonstrate the prima facie case for a potential section 2 violation.86 The
line-drawers must demonstrate the presence of the Gingles
preconditions—compactness, minority political cohesion, and a
majority voting bloc—and that the totality of the circumstances
indicates there would have been a section 2 violation.87 If all these

80. See, e.g., Bethune-Hill II, 326 F. Supp. 3d 128, 138 (E.D. Va. 2018) (explaining that the
legislature self-imposed a requirement that, in a majority-minority district created pursuant
to the VRA, there be a minimum of 55 percent Black Voting Age Population (BVAP) in the
district).
81. See Overby & Cosgrove, supra note 58, at 549 (noting that “[p]acking” limits the
minority community’s influence in the surrounding area).
82. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny after
finding that “[r]ace was ... the predominant, overriding factor explaining the General
Assembly’s decision to attach ... various appendages containing dense majority-black
populations”).
83. Id. at 922.
84. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 915 (1996) (“We assume, arguendo, for the purpose
of resolving this suit, that compliance with § 2 could be a compelling interest.”); see also Bush
v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1002 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) (demonstrating the Court’s
willingness to assume, without deciding, that the State asserted a compelling interest in
section 2 compliance).
85. Shaw, 517 U.S. at 914-15.
86. Caroline A. Wong, Comment, Sued if You Do, Sued if You Don’t: Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act as a Defense to Race-Conscious Districting, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1659, 1678 (2015).
87. Shaw, 517 U.S. at 914-16.
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factors are present, the Court is typically willing to assume that
section 2 compliance is a compelling interest.
Notably, recent developments in the partisan gerrymandering
arena have further complicated the matter. Although partisan
gerrymandering had a long and controversial history through the
courts, in 2019, the Supreme Court ruled that partisan gerrymandering cases are nonjusticiable.88 Although the Court did not condone partisan gerrymandering, it held that there was no way for
courts to create judicially manageable standards to remedy the practice and found that it would be a grave expansion of judicial
authority to attempt to do so.89
This holding acts as a barrier for plaintiffs right at the outset,
creating a “shield” for line-drawers against racial gerrymandering
claims.90 In other words, if the line-drawers can demonstrate that
party, rather than race, was the predominant consideration in line
drawing, the map must only survive rational basis scrutiny, and it
will likely pass constitutional muster.91 In an increasingly partisan
era, this standard is easier to satisfy, resulting in less scrutiny for
potential racial gerrymanders—especially those that purport to use
the VRA as their primary compelling interest.92
If the government demonstrates a compelling interest, the next
step of the strict scrutiny inquiry, the narrow tailoring evaluation,
may also prove unpredictable. Courts are not always clear as to
what factors they look for in their narrow tailoring inquiry in racial
88. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506-08 (2019). But see id. at 2516
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[I]n throwing up its hands, the majority misses something under its
nose: What it says can’t be done has been done. Over the past several years, federal courts
across the country—including, but not exclusively, in the decisions below—have largely
converged on a standard for adjudicating partisan gerrymandering claims.”).
89. Id. at 2506-08 (majority opinion) (exploring the Court’s difficulty with defining fairness
in this case and highlighting that to rule otherwise would be a drastic expansion of judicial
authority).
90. See Kyle Keraga, Note, Drawing the Line: A First Amendment Framework for Partisan
Gerrymandering in the Wake of Rucho v. Common Cause, 79 MD. L. REV. 798, 830 (2020)
(explaining that the Rucho decision weakens racial gerrymandering claims by providing
partisan gerrymandering as a “shield” for lawmakers).
91. See id. at 807-08, 830-31.
92. See Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party, Race as Party, or Party All the Time: Three
Uneasy Approaches to Conjoined Polarization in Redistricting and Voting Cases, 59 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1837, 1840-42 (2018) (outlining three different theories as to how race and party
interact and indicating that they are, in many ways, inseparable).
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gerrymandering and VRA cases. The Supreme Court requires that
courts look for a “strong basis in evidence in support of the (racebased) choice that [the legislature] has made.”93 But what does this
mean? In some cases, it appears that the Court is further scrutinizing the line-drawers’ belief that their actions were necessary.94 In
other cases, the Court seems to be evaluating how well or how precisely the lawmakers complied with section 2 by evaluating the
challenged districts under the Gingles preconditions and the Senate
Factors.95 While the exact focus of the narrow tailoring question is
sometimes unclear, courts are consistent in articulating that they
are looking for a “strong basis in evidence” that the line-drawers
were required to comply with section 2 in drawing the districts as
they did.
This framework leaves room for error or, worse, discriminatory
practices.96 It opens the door for line-drawers, once they have a reasonable belief and a basis in evidence that they should comply with
section 2, to place many—too many—voters of color in a particular
district, which dilutes their overall voting strength.97 In essence, the
current framework creates a floor but does not create a ceiling.
The 2018 case, Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Board of Elections
(Bethune-Hill II), is illustrative.98 The Virginia legislature imposed
a blanket requirement that, in its majority-minority districts, it
would ensure that minority voters composed 55 percent of the Black
Voting Age Population (BVAP).99 After a long and winding road
through the courts, including two trips to the Supreme Court, the
district court held on remand that although the Virginia legislature
93. Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1274 (2015) (internal quotation
omitted).
94. See id. (finding that because the legislature asked the wrong question at the outset
by attempting to preserve existing minority percentages in majority-minority districts, it
reached the wrong answer for the purposes of narrow tailoring).
95. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 916-17 (1996) (holding that because minority voters
were not geographically compact enough, the legislature did not narrowly tailor the district
to comply with section 2).
96. See Curtis, supra note 21, at 478-79.
97. See id.; Overby & Cosgrove, supra note 58, at 549.
98. 326 F. Supp. 3d 128 (E.D. Va. 2018). Note that Bethune-Hill II involved section 5 of
the VRA, a section that is now essentially null. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529
(2013). Section 5 remains relevant, however, to illustrate the way that VRA compliance can
result in an overly “packed” district.
99. Bethune-Hill II, 326 F. Supp. at 138.
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may have properly invoked the VRA as a compelling interest, the
generalized 55 percent BVAP floor was not narrowly tailored to
meet that interest.100
Thus, the problem was not only the racial gerrymander; it was
using the VRA to justify the gerrymander. The problem is not just
placing a majority of voters of color in a particular district; the
problem is placing too many voters of color in a particular district in
the name of the VRA. The conflicting standards, however, allow this
problem to persist. The standards create a loophole in which states
can assert the need to comply with the VRA and then, by not adequately researching or understanding voting patterns, improperly
place too many voters of color in a particular district. Because of the
dangers that these conflicting standards pose, courts must remain
vigilant to identify when line-drawers utilize this loophole and
should create a framework that more readily accounts for this
problem in order to remedy it.
III. A NEW FRAMEWORK: NARROWLY TAILORED TO REALITY
A more workable framework requires the Court to alter the race
predominance inquiry and ensure that the narrow tailoring analysis
realistically and rigorously analyzes vote dilution. This Part addresses the reasons for and benefits of reconsidering both stages of
the analysis. Section A focuses on the reasons for change; it explores
how the current tests are out of touch with the realities that occur
in the process of redistricting and in the courts when districts are
challenged. Next, Section B argues for a presumption of race
predominance in racial gerrymandering and VRA inquiries. This
presumption will help to realign the inquiry with redistricting
realities. Finally, Section C argues that if a state uses section 2
compliance as its compelling interest, courts should evaluate
whether there was a strong basis in evidence to support the raceconscious districting and whether the race-conscious districting
included more minority voters than reasonably necessary to achieve
the VRA’s goals. This change will strengthen accuracy and accountability in the districting process and subsequent litigation.

100. See id. at 179-80.
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A. The Current Tests Are out of Touch with Reality
The current tests do not always provide a meaningful way to
evaluate and remedy the existing loophole. Because the Court
created the equal protection and section 2 standards independent of
one another, the standards do not communicate with one another.
In other words, the racial gerrymandering test does not account for
VRA compliance, and the VRA compliance tests do not account for
racial gerrymandering.101 Each operates in its own universe. This
can become problematic, especially if section 2 is used in ways to
further partisan ends. Currently, line-drawers and judges are not
bound by a legal test to ensure that this problem does not occur.
Mechanical application of these tests loses sight of reality and fails
to protect minority voters.
It is worth noting that some scholars and commentators debate
the distinctiveness of race and party, arguing that race and party
are in many ways inextricable.102 This creates a wrinkle in the
analysis. It makes it far more difficult to determine when race predominates versus when purely partisan means or some combination
of race and party predominate.103 The nonjusticiability of partisan
gerrymandering transforms the problem from a wrinkle in the
analysis into a full roadblock for racial gerrymandering claims, as
does the notion that race is a proxy for partisanship.104
Treating race as a proxy for partisanship could render much of
section 2 obsolete, something that courts should not be willing to do
in light of Congress’s clear intent in the 1982 amendments.105
101. See Wong, supra note 86, at 1659-60.
102. Hasen, supra note 92, at 1865 (“The argument is not that partisanship is equivalent
to racism ... but that the two factors are so inextricably linked under conditions of conjoined
polarization that to discriminate on the basis of one is to discriminate on the basis of the
other.”).
103. See Leading Cases, Cooper v. Harris, 131 HARV. L. REV. 303, 310 (2017) (examining
the “jumbled way that race and party interact in redistricting” and concluding that “race and
party are two sides of the same coin”).
104. See Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court’s Pro-Partisanship Turn, 109 GEO. L.J.
ONLINE 50, 50 (2020).
105. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131, 131 (codified
as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301); see Joshua S. Sellers, Election Law and White Identity
Politics, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1515, 1564 (2019) (explaining that the district court in BethuneHill II “crudely relied upon [race] as a proxy for partisanship”); see also Patino v. City of
Pasadena, 230 F. Supp. 3d 667, 727 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (recognizing that Pasadena county
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Nonetheless, the argument that party, rather than race, predominated in the line-drawing process may be a tempting one for linedrawers to make.106 The argument affords the line-drawers significantly more freedom with significantly less accountability.107 This
Note does not debate nor address where that difficult line should be
drawn, but rather argues that the current frameworks do not
account for the broader realities that these uncertainties create. In
other words, regardless of where the line should be drawn between
race and partisanship, current frameworks allow line-drawers to
toe, cross, or ignore that line altogether.
B. Introducing a Presumption of Race Predominance
In order to ensure that the line-drawers do not abuse the section
2 defense, the framework for the analysis must change so that the
gerrymandering and VRA tests better communicate with one
another. To allow for this type of communication, the Court should
establish a presumption of race predominance in cases for which
VRA compliance serves as the compelling interest.
The key feature of this presumption would be the shifting of the
burden to the other party.108 This burden-shifting framework exists
robustly in other areas of the law, namely in the employment
discrimination context.109 There, courts use a three-step framework.
First, if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the courts shift
the burden onto an employer to demonstrate a nondiscriminatory
reason for termination.110 If the employer does so, the burden shifts
back to the plaintiff to show that the alleged reason was pretextual.111 Courts hearing voting rights cases can borrow the same test.
officials openly understood race and party to be “interchangeable proxies” in the line-drawing
process).
106. See Patino, 230 F. Supp. 3d at 704.
107. See Sellers, supra note 105, at 1564-65 (demonstrating lawmakers’ overt endorsement
of using race as a rough proxy for partisanship, but emphasizing the “discomfiting” nature of
this approach).
108. See Stephen Wolf, Note, Race Ipsa: Vote Dilution, Racial Gerrymandering, and the
Presumption of Racial Discrimination, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 225, 235-36
(1997).
109. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
110. Id.
111. Bainbridge v. Loffredo Gardens, Inc., 378 F.3d 756, 760 (8th Cir. 2004).
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Typically, in VRA claims, the plaintiff needs to show that race
did, in fact, predominate in the government’s line-drawing process.112 Applying a presumption of race predominance at this stage
would shift the burden to the defendant, requiring a showing that
other factors predominated instead.113 If the defendant asserts that
other factors predominated, the plaintiff would have the opportunity
to show, just as in the employment discrimination context, that the
asserted factors were pretextual. If the defendant cannot demonstrate that other factors predominated or a court finds the other
factors pretextual, a court should evaluate the majority-minority
district under strict scrutiny.114 At that point, the defendant may
assert section 2 compliance as the compelling interest for race-based
boundaries.115
Like other presumptions, the presumption of race predominance
would be rebuttable. For example, if the defendant demonstrates
particularly unique considerations to the district that line-drawers
considered more heavily and predominately than race (but nevertheless created a majority-minority district), the defendant may successfully rebut the presumption. Additionally, a demonstration that
the line-drawers sought to adhere to a constitutional or statutory
command or priority could rebut the presumption. For example, if
a state’s constitution requires preservation of communities of interest and the line-drawers maintained a particular religious or social
community (and in doing so, created a majority-minority district),
they could rebut the presumption of race predominance.
The reason for this presumption is simple—it aligns with the
reality of what line-drawers experience as they draw district lines.
The presumption places emphasis and pressure on the appropriate
actors and requires that governments adequately explain why

112. See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1463-64 (2017).
113. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
114. This presumption would reverse the approach taken by the Court in Cooper v. Harris
by requiring that the North Carolina legislature demonstrate the traditional race-neutral
criteria that it used. Although in that case the plaintiffs prevailed on the predominance point,
this alternate standard would have presumed race predominance at the outset. See Cooper,
137 S. Ct. at 1463-64.
115. See supra note 84 and accompanying text; see also Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1464 (“This
Court has long assumed that one compelling interest is complying with ... the Voting Rights
Act of 1965.”).
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something that looks like race predominance is not.116 If linedrawers are to assert that they drew a district for the purpose of
conforming with section 2, it should be presumed at the outset that
race predominated in the process of drawing that district.
Courts already face uncertainty in determining just which factor
predominated in the line-drawing process.117 The race-predominance
inquiry is neither intuitive nor easy. In the redistricting context,
“predominant” means “that the legislature subordinated traditional
race-neutral districting principles ... to racial considerations.”118
Merriam-Webster defines “predominant” as “having superior
strength, influence, or authority.”119 The definition courts employ,
then, is less specific than the dictionary definition of predominance.
In their inquiries, courts ask if all other traditional criteria were
subverted to race rather than asking if race had a superior influence. This distinction is a small but noteworthy one. Requiring a
showing that all other factors were subverted in a process of
countless considerations is more subjective and difficult than considering the influence and strength of the racial considerations
generally.
For example, in Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama,
the Supreme Court held that the lower court improperly considered
whether race did or did not predominate.120 In that case, the district
court placed the legislature’s goal of equal population in each
district on equal footing with consideration of racial factors.121 The
Court held that the scheme was improper because the line-drawers
should have treated the equal population consideration as a background condition rather than weighed evenly against racial
considerations.122 The Supreme Court did not hold that race
predominated, but rather stated that the outcome could have been
different if the district court properly weighed these factors.123
116. See, e.g., Bethune-Hill I, 141 F. Supp. 3d 505, 554 (E.D. Va. 2015), aff’d in part,
vacated in part, 137 S. Ct. 788 (2017).
117. See Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct 1257, 1267 (2015).
118. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995).
119. Predominant, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
predominant [https://perma.cc/2Q4C-G8PL].
120. Ala. Legis. Black Caucus, 135 S. Ct. at 1270.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1272.
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Hypothetically, if the court had applied a presumption of race
predominance to the district at the outset, race-predominance would
be presumed. The district court would then consider whether the
equal population rationale was sufficient to rebut the presumption.
If the defendants could not properly show that equal population was
considered to a significantly greater degree than race, the district
would be subject to strict scrutiny.
When a government asserts that the compelling state interest for
creating a majority-minority district was to comply with an Act that
demands race-consciousness and race-based considerations, it is out
of touch with the very definition of “predominant” to insist that race
did not predominate.124 Race cannot be both an afterthought and a
forethought at the same time; applying a presumption of race-predominance to majority-minority districts would foreclose that
argument.
C. The Need for an Expanded Narrow Tailoring Analysis
Courts should also reevaluate how they assess narrow tailoring
in gerrymandering and section 2 cases. Currently, when the government asserts section 2 compliance as a compelling interest, courts
primarily evaluate whether the government credibly anticipated
that it would need to comply with the VRA at the narrow tailoring
stage.125 Courts may phrase the strong basis in evidence test in
different ways, but it boils down to this:
Narrow tailoring in the context of VRA compliance means that
the [jurisidction] must show “it had ‘a strong basis in evidence’
for concluding that the [VRA] required its action,” or, stated
differently, “that it had ‘good reasons’ to think that it would
transgress the [VRA] if it did not draw race-based district
lines.”126

124. See Wong, supra note 86, at 1669-71 (explaining the complications associated with
demonstrating or disproving racial dominance in gerrymandering cases).
125. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 656 (1993); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 915
(1996).
126. Navajo Nation v. San Juan County, 929 F.3d 1270, 1281 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting
Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1464 (2017)).
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The Supreme Court has stated that the search for “good reasons”
affords states “breathing room,” such that they may “adopt ... compliance measures that may prove, in perfect hindsight, not to have
been needed.”127
In a case involving racial gerrymandering and VRA compliance,
however, this inquiry may stop the analysis short, or in other words,
the “breathing room” may afford states too much latitude.128 On one
hand, the government needs to show that the conditions were such
that it had a strong basis in evidence to believe it needed to make
a majority-minority district.129 On the other hand, once the government establishes this strong basis in evidence, the current frameworks do not adequately account for what happens if the government goes “too far,” placing “too many” voters of color in a district,
ultimately diluting their votes.
In order to more rigorously and meaningfully scrutinize these
types of districts, courts should not only evaluate whether there was
a strong basis in evidence to support the belief that the line-drawers
needed to comply with the VRA. They should go one step further,
asking whether the line-drawers added more voters of color than
reasonably necessary to comport with section 2’s goals. This
requirement would insist that courts look at the actual dilutive
effect on the minority votes in that district.130 If a court finds that
the district was required to create a majority-minority district, but
that the district has more voters of color than reasonably necessary
to elect the voters’ preferred candidate, then the district is diluting
minority votes. Thus, it cannot be narrowly tailored to comply with
section 2, which, at its core, exists to prevent vote dilution.131

127. Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1464.
128. See id.
129. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 977 (1996) (reaffirming the idea that narrow
tailoring requires a “strong basis in evidence” that the government should comply with section
2, as well as the requirement that the government must substantially address the fictional
section 2 violation).
130. See Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 1663, 1666-67 (2001) (discussing the individual versus collective nature of vote dilution
harms and the intricacies of remedying those harms).
131. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986) (“The essence of a § 2 claim is that
a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions
to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their
preferred representatives.”).
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The first benefit of this more rigorous approach to narrow
tailoring is it would hold line-drawers accountable to more careful
and honest redistricting.132 If courts consider not only the linedrawers’ basis for believing the Gingles preconditions are satisfied,
but also whether there are more minority voters than necessary to
comply with the VRA’s goals based on the preconditions, then linedrawers are less likely to stop short at identifying minority communities that ought to make up a majority-minority district.133 Instead,
the approach requires that line-drawers calculate more precisely
how many minority voters ought to be in that district as they
comply with section 2 to ensure that they do not dilute votes.
Additionally, a more rigorous narrow tailoring analysis would uphold the interests of section 2 and protect minority voting strength.
Analyzing narrow tailoring would essentially be a game of alternatives and comparing the relative treatment of various groups.134
Instead of primarily analyzing the conditions present when the linedrawers drew the districts, courts should look just as carefully at
the conditions created as a result. Courts should evaluate multiple
factors when determining whether there are more voters of color in
a district than reasonably necessary: (1) the percentage of minority
voters in the district, (2) the geographical alternatives for districting
that would strengthen minority votes elsewhere, and (3) the racial
bloc voting patterns for the voters of the district at issue and
surrounding areas.135
The first factor a court should consider is the percentage of
minority voters in the district. At the outset, there is no perfect or
accurate threshold number required—it should instead be considered as a fact-based, case-by-case inquiry. Of course, the majorityminority district will be composed of over 50 percent people of

132. J. GERALD HEBERT, PAUL M. SMITH, MARTINA E. VANDENBERG & MICHAEL B.
DESANCTIS, THE REALIST’S GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING: AVOIDING THE LEGAL PITFALLS ix (2d ed.
2010) (“[T]he realist understands that states simply cannot draw districting plans that will
go unchallenged in the courts. The best that realistically can be hoped for is to draw plans
that will not be successfully challenged.”).
133. Id. at 41.
134. See Gerken, supra note 130, at 1735.
135. See HEBERT ET AL., supra note 132, at 70 (acknowledging the value of using reapportionment data in redistricting).
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color.136 In a racial gerrymandering case, it will likely be more than
that.137 The question then becomes—how much more is too much
more?
In Bethune-Hill II, the district court determined that a 55 percent
threshold was too much, finding an unconstitutional racial gerrymander as a result.138 The 55 percent threshold was not invalid as
a bright-line rule; it was invalid because the threshold meant that
line-drawers were not doing the legwork to determine voting
patterns and the adequate number of minority voters in each VRArequired majority-minority district.139 Thus, if line-drawers set a
target threshold percentage, courts should be wary of upholding the
district at the narrow tailoring stage because it will likely overshoot
the number of minority voters reasonably necessary to accomplish
the VRA’s goals.
However, because there can be no exact bright-line percentage as
to how much is too much or too little, a useful lens for looking at
percentage can also be the change in percentage from the last
redistricting cycle.140 If the district already existed as a majorityminority district and the percentage of minority voters added to the
district in the next redistricting cycle drastically (or even moderately) increases without support from racial bloc voting data, it may
raise a red flag to the courts that there is vote dilution hidden
behind the VRA compliance.141 Assessing these changes in minority
voter percentage can help courts determine whether compliance
with section 2 is narrowly tailored.
Additionally, courts should evaluate the geographical boundaries
to examine whether communities of racial minorities were included
in the district at issue that could have or should have been included
elsewhere to strengthen the minority vote. Take, for example, the
136. See Note, The Future of Majority-Minority Districts in Light of Declining Racially
Polarized Voting, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2208, 2208 (2003).
137. Bethune-Hill I, 141 F. Supp. 3d 505, 553 (E.D. Va. 2015) (acknowledging that the
legislature set a 55 percent BVAP population standard as the minimum for majority-minority
districts), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 137 S. Ct. 788 (2017).
138. See Bethune-Hill II, 326 F. Supp. 3d 128, 137 (E.D. Va. 2018). The Bethune-Hill II
court did not reach this finding at the narrow tailoring stage, but under this shifted analysis,
it likely would have.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 155 (discussing the changes in BVAP percentage from the previous districts
to the newly drawn districts).
141. See id.
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map at issue in Bush v. Vera.142 In that case, the legislature had
used computerized racial data to draw its highly irregular-looking
districts.143 In determining that the district was not narrowly
tailored, the Court emphasized the irregularity of the district’s
shape.144 The Court took particular issue with the way that the
district “sprawl[ed]” through multiple counties and neighborhoods
to “connect dispersed minority population[s].”145 When courts ask
explicitly whether line-drawers included more voters of color in the
district than reasonably necessary, this is the type of inquiry that
courts should engage in, scrutinizing the contours of the boundaries
to assess whether the government ultimately diluted minority
voting strength.
Finally, courts should carefully assess racial bloc voting data to
assess not only whether the data indicates that a majority-minority
community should have been drawn, but also to assess whether the
data indicates the line-drawers over-inflated the number of minority
voters in the district.146 Courts can evaluate for a baseline number
of minority voters needed based on previous voting data to elect a
community of color’s candidate of choice. Then the courts can
evaluate how far beyond that threshold the line-drawers went; the
further from the baseline threshold, the less likely the district is
truly narrowly tailored to achieve the VRA’s goals.
Making these slight but noteworthy changes to the VRA framework would improve overall outcomes for voters and line-drawers.
Establishing a presumption of race predominance for majorityminority districts provides the benefit of clarity and consistency to
both the line-drawers and the courts. For the line-drawers, it allows
more freedom in districting without fear of suit or repercussions.147
Even well-intentioned line-drawers are caught in thorny situations

142. 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
143. Id. at 961-62.
144. Id. at 980-81.
145. Id. at 965-66 (quoting Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1337-38 (S.D. Tex. 1994)).
146. See generally LISA HANDLEY, VOTE DILUTION: MEASURING VOTING PATTERNS BY
RACE/ETHNICITY, https://www.ncsl.org/documents/legismgt/vote_dilusion.pdf [https://
perma.cc/NS6U-J2YD].
147. HEBERT ET AL., supra note 132, at ix (warning state line-drawers that facing lawsuits
is unavoidable and arguing that the most meaningful step states can take is to prepare to win
those lawsuits).
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when attempting to draw district lines with race-consciousness.148
They do not know how much is too much.149 Line-drawers should
know that if they believe they need to comply with section 2 or claim
they believe so, courts will presume race predominance and evaluate
their districts using strict scrutiny. Furthermore, line-drawers
should know that under strict scrutiny, courts will analyze not only
whether there was a strong basis in evidence that the Gingles
preconditions were present, but whether in drawing a race-conscious district, the line-drawers included more voters of color than
reasonably necessary to achieve the VRA’s goal. This will demand
that line-drawers more meaningfully scrutinize alternatives to
prioritize minority voting strength and more carefully assess racial
bloc voting data to ensure they do not dilute minority votes when
creating VRA-compliant districts.
IV. HOW FAR IS TOO FAR? AND OTHER COUNTERARGUMENTS
Any suggested change to the Court’s current framework, especially standards so intertwined with politics and democracy, comes
with critiques and questions. This Part explores those counterarguments and answers the questions that they raise. Section A
addresses the concern that adopting these changes pushes courts too
deep into the political thicket by explaining that the proposed test
alters when courts make significant considerations as opposed to
what courts consider. Next, Section B responds to questions as to
whether this test works for or against the interests of the VRA,
emphasizing that the test contains inherent checks to support the
interests of the VRA. Lastly, Section C evaluates this proposal’s
significance in light of speculation that the Court may be inclined to
invalidate or modify section 2 in the future. That Section highlights
the utility of the framework even in the absence of section 2 as it
currently stands.

148. See generally George W. Jordan III, Note, Navigating the Constitutional Minefield of
Race-Conscious Redistricting, 2 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 81 (1995).
149. See id. at 81-83, 85.
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A. Are Courts Too Deep in the Thicket?
One of the primary and recurring concerns with making changes
to the redistricting analysis is whether such changes thrust courts
too far into the political thicket.150 It could be argued that this Note’s
rigorous and targeted analysis pushes the involvement of the courts
too far. Opponents of a race-predominance presumption or more
rigorous narrow tailoring analysis may argue that without judicial
restraint in this area, courts will measure and rule on the subjective
abilities and failures of line-drawers in these complex cases. That is
to say, courts will simply be ruling on whether the line-drawers did
the best that they could when districting.
This argument misconstrues the nature of the suggested changes.
The courts already engage in an analysis of line-drawers’ motivations and measure their successes; that analysis just occurs at an
earlier point in the inquiry.151 By adopting the presumption at the
outset and closely scrutinizing at the narrow tailoring inquiry, the
bulk of the analysis merely shifts to a later stage.152 For example, in
Bethune-Hill II, instead of using the rigorous analysis the court
engaged in at the race predominance stage, much of the analysis
would come into play at the narrow tailoring stage to determine
whether the legislature diluted the minority votes or complied with
the goals of the VRA.153
Because the Court has already wandered into the redistricting
and equal protection arenas, it cannot and should not wander out
when the inquiries get more complex. Rather than further immersing courts in the political thicket, this proposal should instead be
viewed as more precisely defining a court’s role and scope of
analysis in the thicket. Instead of evaluating whether line-drawers
did their best by some vague or undefined standard, courts would be
holding line-drawers accountable to the very standards they claim
150. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). The Court’s cry to refrain from
entering the political thicket sounds more like an echo in the wind now. Although courts often
nod to the idea of refraining from entering, in practice the courts are enmeshed in the thicket.
Hamilton, supra note 15, at 1564.
151. See Bethune-Hill II, 326 F. Supp. 3d 128, 155 (E.D. Va. 2018) (demonstrating the
rigorous level of analysis and scrutiny by which the court assessed the contours of the Virginia
districts at issue).
152. See id.
153. See id.
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to abide by.154 Make no mistake: courts are already in the thicket.155
The more consistently and clearly their role in the thicket is defined,
the more line-drawers can draw honest, VRA-compliant lines with
more predictable judicial outcomes.
B. Could This Test Work Against the Interests of the
Voting Rights Act?
Another concern that may arise from this proposed test is that it
could work against the interests of the VRA by subjecting majorityminority districts to stricter scrutiny with the presumption of race
predominance. At first glance, this may look like a stark concern.
When looking at the purpose and motive of the change, however, the
proposal furthers, rather than undercuts, the intentions of the VRA.
Under the existing framework, when a court determines that race
predominated, it subjects the district to strict scrutiny.156 For this
reason, it may seem counterintuitive to apply a presumption of race
predominance right at the outset to majority-minority districts. But
this does not mean the district is dead on arrival.
When accounting for a narrow tailoring analysis that focuses on
a strong basis in evidence and a direct inquiry into overinflating
minority voters in a particular district, this test works hand-in-hand
with the VRA. While it certainly would be counterproductive to
invalidate districts just because the line-drawers assert VRA
compliance, it is equally unproductive to afford the line-drawers a
blank check to “pack” districts when asserting that interest. In
essence, the test weeds out districts that may be legitimately
created as majority-minority districts but are illegitimately racial
gerrymanders. By accounting for and examining actual vote dilution
when analyzing narrow tailoring, this Note’s proposal tempers, if
not eliminates, this concern.

154. See supra Part III.B.
155. See, e.g., Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001) (providing just one example of the
Court parsing through race and redistricting concerns by using data, voting behavior, and
statements of legislators, to name a few).
156. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1464 (2017).
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C. What if Section 2 Is Struck down in the Coming Future?
Finally, it is worth considering what happens if the Court strikes
down section 2. Commentators have speculated that various aspects
of section 2, if not the whole provision, face a grim future.157 As recently as June 2021, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in an
Arizona case about section 2.158 In that case, the Court considered
whether Arizona’s statute that required out-of-precinct voters’
ballots to be discarded and a statute that made it a felony to deliver
another person’s mail-in ballot violated section 2.159 In its opinion,
the Court traced the history of the VRA and ultimately held that
Arizona’s laws did not violate section 2, even if there was a small
disparate impact on racial minorities.160 The Court took care to
emphasize that its jurisprudence has been significantly developed
in the vote dilution context, whereas this was an issue of first impression in the vote denial context.161 While the Court may have
limited the application of section 2 in vote denial cases, it did not
address the constitutionality of the provision as a whole or discuss
the possibility of altering its analysis within the dilution context.162
Nonetheless, it is impossible to know what exactly will remain of
the VRA if, in the future, the Supreme Court does strike down
section 2 in part or in its entirety. What will almost certainly
remain, however, is the motivation on the part of most line-drawers
to draw lines in politically beneficial—and potentially nefarious—
ways.163 Should section 2 become significantly diminished, it is not
likely that racial gerrymandering, or variations of it, will disappear
or diminish with it. When districts are challenged as racial gerrymanders, courts will likely still utilize similar standards to analyze
157. See, e.g., Li & Rudensky, supra note 24, at 734-35. Just last term, the Supreme Court
decided a case debating the limits of section 2. Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S.
Ct. 2321 (2021).
158. See Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2321.
159. Id. at 2334.
160. Id. at 2346.
161. Id. at 2333 (“In the years since Gingles, we have heard a steady stream of § 2 votedilution cases, but until today we have not considered how § 2 applies to generally applicable
time, place, or manner voting rules.” (footnotes omitted)). But see Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874,
892-93 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing for a “systematic reassessment” of the Court’s
analysis of section 2 in vote dilution cases).
162. See Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2330-34.
163. See Hasen, supra note 92, at 1854-55.
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those challenges. Instead of using section 2, however, line-drawers
will have to assert some other compelling interest. Even if that
interest is not section 2 compliance, if the line-drawers assert that
in order to satisfy equal protection purposes or other statutory
obligations they must draw the lines as they did, a presumption of
racial predominance is equally appropriate.
Additionally, a more searching narrow tailoring analysis ensures
that whatever compelling interest the line-drawers assert, courts
should not only assess whether they correctly asserted that interest
at the outset, but also how well they drew the district in order to adequately comply with that asserted interest. Come what may to
section 2, this proposal still provides a meaningful lens and frame
of analysis for courts to use by acknowledging the reality of racial
predominance in redistricting and more closely scrutinizing narrow
tailoring.
CONCLUSION
Legislative line-drawing is no easy task. Line-drawers must comb
through countless policy, legal, and practical considerations at every
stage of redistricting. But courts must determine if and when those
considerations push beyond proper boundaries and discriminate
against or dilute minority votes. Currently the Supreme Court’s
tests contain a loophole; that loophole provides line-drawers the
opportunity to pack an improperly large number of minority voters
into a legislative district and claim that the line-drawers were
required to do so by the VRA. Because the VRA and equal protection
assert two different interests at different phases of analysis, they do
not communicate with one another or put a check on this type of
improper districting.
In order to more meaningfully reflect the interests that the Equal
Protection Clause and the VRA attempt to protect, the Court should
establish a presumption of race predominance when considering a
majority-minority district created in compliance with section 2.
When evaluating these districts under strict scrutiny, compliance
with section 2 serves as a compelling interest; however, in order to
establish narrow tailoring, the government must not only show a
strong basis in evidence that the Gingles preconditions were
present, but that they did not include more minority voters than
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reasonably necessary in the district to accomplish the VRA’s goals.
Amending these two stages of the analysis ensures that linedrawers comply with the VRA by creating majority-minority
districts when necessary and valuable, but that they do not minimize the effectiveness of minority votes in doing so.
The interaction between racial gerrymandering and section 2 is
only one tree in the voting rights thicket, but it is an important one.
How we vote, when we vote, and who we vote for certainly matter,
but these factors cannot be effective without confidence in where we
vote from. The contours of each legislative district in the United
States shape the leadership, policy, and progress of our democracy—it is important, if not fundamental, that courts and legislatures have clear and honest standards with which to evaluate these
districts and promote equality.
Megan B. Kelly*

* J.D. Candidate 2022, William & Mary Law School; B.A. Creative Writing 2017,
University of Arizona. Thank you to everyone on the William & Mary Law Review staff who
brought this Note from a fleeting idea to a final product. This Note is for my Aunt Jennifer,
who hated nothing like she hated inequality.

